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Abstract 
Global Constitutionalisation offers a utopian picture of the future of international law. Its 
advocates suggest a governance system is emergent that will fill the gaps in legitimacy, 
democracy and the rule of law present in international law. The aim is to create a better global 
legal order, by filling these gaps with both normative and procedural constitutionalism, but, 
better for whom? Feminism has challenged the foundations of both international law and 
constitutionalism. It demonstrates that the design of normative structures accommodate and 
sustain prevailing patriarchal forms that leave little room for alternative accounts or voices. 
Both international and constitutional law’s structures support the status quo and are resistant 
to critical and feminist voices. The question is whether it is possible for constitutionalism to 
change international law in ways that will open it to alternate possibilities. Feminist 
Constitutionalism aims to rebuild and rethink constitutional law and reflect feminist experience 
and debate, to redefine its limits and refocus its ambitions, opening it to new concerns. Global 
Constitutionalism is not, up to the present, concerned with such questioning. It has been 
immune to questioning of its underlying aims or assumptions. This chapter considers whether 
global constitutionalism, grounded in feminist discourse, could offer international law and 
global constitutionalism a new pathway. In does so by offering a manifesto which global 
constitutionalism can take to inculcate feminist concerns into its processes from the outset.  
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Global Constitutionalisation queries whether a new constitution(s) is emerging beyond the 
state. Global constitutionalism is an attempt to reshape constitutionalism for the global 
stage. While a relatively young debate, emerging in the 2000s, global constitutionalism finds 
it antecedents in domestic and comparative constitutional debate. Albeit global 
constitutionalism is distinct from both. Feminist interventions within domestic and 
comparative constitutionalism make critical fissures in the accepted norms of constitutional 
faith. This piece looks at global constitutionalism and asks two questions. First, has global 
constitutionalism taken on board the critiques that feminist scholars have offered 
constitutionalism? Second, how would feminist global constitutionalism work in practice? In 
response, it offers a seven-point manifesto that would inculcate a feminist ethic into global 
constitutionalism thus avoiding the patriarchal dividends that its domestic counterparts 
established.   
 
The relative youth of the debate means there is no accepted definition of global 
constitutionalism. Generally, it takes one of the following forms: a world constitution  based 
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upon the UN Charter,1  a series of constitutional documents or constitutional norms for 
specific areas of global governance such as free trade,2 or specific groups of international 
norms such as jus cogens.3 Global constitutional lawyers engage in a hybrid normative and 
descriptive project to find and explain constitutional processes at the international level.4  At 
its core is a desire to improve both international and global law, making them more 
legitimate. Though whether this legitimacy has some basis in feminist legal critique remains 
open to debate and is the subject of this chapter. 
 
Whilst begun by Alfred Verdross in the 1930s, it was not until the early 2000s that global 
constitutionalism emerged as a distinct debate.5 What differentiates the global variant from 
domestic or comparative constitutionalism is its direct relationship with international law. 
Global constitutionalism regards the latter as constitutionalising rather than a 
conglomeration of domestic constitutional orders feeding into a shared constitutional 
structure. Such a strict delineation between domestic, comparative and global 
constitutionalism is untenable particularly in monist legal systems. Yet, global scholarship 
has only recently engaged directly with comparative and domestic normative and theoretical 
work. This chapter focuses on the global debate and the dearth of feminist scholarship 
located there, or perhaps more accurately the lack of engagement with existing 
constitutional feminist scholarship. In doing so, we place firm reliance on the work of 
domestic and comparative feminist constitutional scholars whose work is critical to 
constitutionalism and who are thus contributing to global constitutionalism even if that 
debate fails to recognise its worth. This chapter seeks to bring their contribution to bare upon 
the global constitutionalisation debate and tease out where global constitutionalism may 
create or re-purpose problematic elements of domestic constitutional normative orders and 
reproduce them at the international level. In addition, it considers the unique feminist 
critiques of global constitutionalism whose problematic nature stem from its structure as a 
global rather than comparative or domestic constitutional debate. 
 
                                                 
1 Bardo Fassbender, ‘The Meaning of International Constitutional Law’ in Ronald St John 
Macdonald and Douglas Johnston (eds), Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal 
Ordering of the World Community (Brill, 2005) 837, 844. 
2 Joel Trachtman, ‘The Constitutions of the World Trade Organisation’ (2006) 17(3) European 
Journal of International Law 623; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Multilevel Trade Governance in 
the WTO Requires Multilevel Constitutionalism’ in Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and International Economic 
Law (Hart, 2011) 5. 
3 See for example, Anne Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and 
Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures’ (2006) 19(3) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 579, 598 (jus cogens); Karolina Milewicz, ‘Emerging Patterns of Global 
Constitutionalization: Towards a Conceptual Framework’ (2009) 16 Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies 413, 416 (norms). 
4 On the relationship between the normative and descriptive projects of global 
constitutionalism see, Jean d’Aspremont, ‘International Constitutionalism, Legal Forms, and 
the Need for Villains’ in Anthony Lang and Antje Wiener (eds), The Handbook of Global 
Constitutionalism (Edward Elgar, 2017). (Forthcoming). 
5 EU law debates being the exception. 
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Questions on how power is conferred, divided and used abound within domestic and 
comparative constitutional law. Feminist questioning of constitutional norms such as the 
separation of power, rule of law, democratic legitimacy and human rights established clear 
critiques of these tropes across domestic and comparative law. Feminist constitutional and 
human rights scholars highlight how legal structures exclude women and marginalise their 
rights and interests. Constitutional (alongside human rights and equality) law can be 
empowering,6 but feminist scholars argue it can also be overly restrictive.7 Constitutional 
legal structures can close down discursive spaces and political questions become legalised.8 
 
Within international and human rights law, feminist scholars challenge the assumptions 
underpinning the law and expose their gendered nature. For example, they challenge the 
public/private distinction in international human rights law that acts to side-line violence 
against women.9 In doing so feminist international law has utilised the wealth of scholarship 
within other legal sectors in its critique. This chapter seeks to repeat this laudable 
interchange between scholars by asking whether global constitutionalisation debate can be 
feminist. 
 
Despite calls to engage with feminist critiques,10 global constitutionalism appears oblivious 
to critical literatures within domestic and comparative constitutional law (and also to those 
within international law). Global constitutional lawyers talk of the rule of law, the separation 
of powers and democratic legitimacy from a traditional liberal perspective, seemingly 
indifferent to the feminist critiques of these ideas. This chapter aims to start a discussion 
where feminist scholarships and global constitutional law speak to one another. The chapter 
begins by outlining global constitutionalism and the current state of the literature. The piece 
then moves to existing feminist critiques of core constitutional norms within domestic and 
comparative law specifically the separation of powers, the rule of law and democratic 
legitimacy before asking where the space may lie for a feminist global constitutionalism. In 
the final section we proffer a seven-part manifesto for a feminist global constitutionalism.  
 
                                                 
6 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, ‘Feminism and International Law: An Opportunity’ (2002) 14 Yale 
Journal of Law and Feminism 345, 355 ‘In the face of such overwhelming wrongs, the 
universalist human rights discourse has been extraordinarily powerful, indeed 
transformative, for women around the world’. 
7 Judy Fudge, ‘The Effect of Entrenching a Bill of Rights upon Political Discourse: Feminist 
Demands and Sexual Violence in Canada’ (1989) 17 International Journal of Sociology 445. 
8 Reg Greycar and Jenny Morgan, ‘Equality Rights: What’s Wrong?’ in Rosemary Hunter (eds), 
Rethinking Equality Projects in Law: Feminist Challenges (Hart, 2008) 109, 124. 
9 Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to 
International Law’ (1991) 85(4) The American Journal of International Law 613; Dianne Otto, 
‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’ in Anne Orford, Florian Hoffmann and Martin 
Clark (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law (Oxford University Press, 
2016) 488.  
10 Anthony F Lang, Jr et al, ‘Interdisciplinarity: Challenges and opportunities’ (2013) 2(1) 
Global Constitutionalism 1, 4. ‘Feminist analyses of how constitutionalism might disempower 
women or re-enact gender distinctions or assumptions about sexual orientation would 
provide new insights on global constitutionalism.’ 
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Yet, a note of caution is necessary. Even if feminist theory is brought into global 
constitutional scholarship, whether global constitutionalism is receptive to change is 
debatable. Global constitutional law as a project has sought to reform international law, to 
make it more people-centred,11 to increase its legitimacy. Yet, a radical or Marxist feminist 
critique might suggest that constitutionalism is so conservative and patriarchal that even a 
new project like global constitutionalism cannot respond adequately to feminist critique. 
Conservative in the sense of being tied to convention and traditional social and economic 
systems, and patriarchal in its maintenance of structures that are inescapably misogynist. In 
asking can global constitutionalisation be feminist this chapter is aware of such critique and 
is prepared for the pitfalls which may follow for women should international law be subject 
to a global constitutionalisation process. 
II GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISATION: STATE OF PLAY 
 
The variety of research questions that encompasses global constitutionalism makes defining 
it difficult. It can stand for the search of a world constitution, a series of constitutional 
systems, or the identification of constitutionalisation processes within international law and 
global governance. What differentiates global constitutionalism from comparative projects 
is the distinct focus on international law rather than on the distinctions and trends amongst 
existing domestic constitutional structures. Some global constitutional scholars reject any 
claim that it ought to resemble existing constitutional orders. As a scholarly project, it is 
criticised as both euro-centric and imposing on global governance an inherently conservative 
structure premised in liberal constitutionalism.12 While interest in global scholarship is 
expanding beyond Europe, there appears to be little appetite, beyond the work of Schwöbel 
and Krivenko, for critical interventions. But, global constitutionalisation remains in scholarly 
terms a youthful debate, and there lies the potential for it to develop debates hitherto 
absent. This section does not set out in full detail the intricacies of the global constitutional 
debate, rather it describes the state of play from which a feminist narrative can launch. 
 
The scholarship on Global Constitutionalisation divides into two broad categories; 
institutional and normative constitutionalism.13 Institutional constitutionalism concerns the 
location and institutionalisation of power at the global level.14 It focuses on the 
constitutionalisation of international institutions or organisations. For example, some argue 
                                                 
11 Ekaterina Yahyaoui Krivenko, ‘Feminism, Modern Philosophy and the Future of Legitimacy 
of International Constitutionalism’ (2009) 11 International Community Law Review 219. 
12 Anne Peters, ‘Global Constitutionalism’ in The Encyclopaedia of Political Thought (John 
Wiley and Sons Ltd 2014). 
13 Other categorisations have been suggested by Christine E J Schwöbel, Global 
Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff, 2011); Milewicz, above 
n 3.  
14 Christine Schwöbel, ‘Situating the debate on global constitutionalism’ (2010) 8(3) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 611, 617. 
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that the UN Charter is ‘constitutional’15 because of its commitment to peace and security,16 
its supremacy17 and universal membership.18 Similarly the WTO and the rise of adjudicative 
bodies are both suggested as constitutional or constitutionalising. Normative 
constitutionalism assembles constitutional norms derived from international law but may 
also borrow from state constitutionalism, such as the right to property. The former, which 
labels international legal norms as constitutional identifies their content and supremacy as 
indicators of constitutionalism. Jus cogens and erga omnes norms are most often the 
touchstones for such claims.19 The second form of normative constitutionalism is to take 
constitutional norms – the rule of law, separation of powers and democratic legitimacy, – 
and find evidence of their (potential) operationalisation within international law. This 
method has the strongest link with domestic and comparative constitutionalism. Global 
constitutionalism’s unifying quality is its reliance on constitutional frameworks, both 
normative and institutional, to look at international law through a constitutional lens. 
 
A clear issue with methodology arises in discussing international law through 
constitutionalist language. For instance, in relation to domestic constitutionalism, debate as 
to the extent to which its norms are translatable to the global level abound.20 There are 
questions as to whether the methodologies employed by comparative constitutional 
scholars are pertinent or not to the global debate. Nevertheless, global constitutionalism 
reads both international law and global governance through a constitutionalist lens informed 
by the practise at the domestic level.  
 
Within Global Constitutionalisation ‘structural’ norms are approached from a liberal 
constitutionalist perspective,21 but the detailed treatment found in domestic constitutional 
studies remains lacking.22 The rule of law within global constitutionalist literature is under-
theorised; it is synonymous with introducing more law to global governance, law 
                                                 
15 Ronald St. John Macdonald, ‘The International Community as a Legal Community’ in 
Ronald St. John Macdonald and Donald M. Johnston (eds), Towards World Constitutionalism–
Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) 853, 
879. 
16  Schwöbel, above n 14, 623. 
17 Bardo Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International 
Community’ (1998) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529, 577-578. 
18 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Hat die Konstitutionaliserung des Völkerrechts non eine chance?’ in 
Idem, Des gespaltene Westen (2004) 113, 159 cited in Fassbender, above n 1, 847. 
19 Erika de Wet, ‘The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems as a 
Manifestation of the Emerging International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 19 Leiden Journal 
of International Law 611, 614-616. 
20 On global constitutionalism being separate from domestic constitutionalism see Aoife 
O’Donoghue, ‘International constitutionalism and the state’ (2013) 11(4) International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 1021, 1030. 
21 Schwöbel, above n 14, 612. 
22 For a critique of the global constitutionalisation debate see Aoife O’Donoghue, 
Constitutionalism in Global Constitutionalisation (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 243. 
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enforcement,23 the use of law by states to justify their actions or as a synonym for 
legalisation.24 Rarely is it understood as certainty25 or consistency in international law.26 
Questions of substantive equality and accountability, which form part of a thick rule of law 
in traditional constitutional literature, are not discussed within global constitutionalist 
scholarship.27 The rule of law within global constitutionalisation ‘does not fully translate into 
the ability of constituent power holders to exercise their rights or institute a substantive rule 
of law’.28 Separation of powers within domestic constitutional scholarship refers to the 
tripartite divestment of power between executive, legislature and judiciary. But within global 
constitutional literature, it is located in the fragmentation of international law29 or 
characterised as structural forms within international organisations.30 The separation of 
powers in global constitutionalisation is not a horizontal separation, but often based on a 
geographical or vertical separation between state and international organisations. 
Democratic legitimacy’s meaning in global constitutionalisation is contested, not least 
because there is a failure to define what is meant by democracy. The prevailing approach is 
to speak of participation and representation in global governance,31 achieved through state-
based models, which side-line genuine individual or collective participation at international 
organisations. These structural constitutional norms are often simplified within the global 
context. One of the reasons for this is the missing constituency.32 The question of who 
benefits from Global Constitutionalisation is often left unanswered or is insufficiently linked 
to people.  
 
Feminists, alongside critical legal scholars, have subjected constitutional law and 
international law to rigorous critique; highlighting the structural inequalities perpetuated by 
it and exposing the conservative nature of its legal frameworks. Given the extent to which 
Global Constitutionalism builds on constitutional and international law, it is surprising that 
by global constitutional lawyers has not drawn on the critical scholarship within these fields. 
Without a concrete definition, Global Constitutionalism can be many things to many people; 
from normative interventions to institutional reforms. Clearly, feminist critiques are apt 
                                                 
23 Anne Peters, ‘Constitutional Fragments: On the Interaction of Constitutionalization and 
Fragmentation in International Law’ (Working Paper No 2, Centre for Global 
Constitutionalism University of St Andrews, 14 April 2015) 9. 
24 Ian Hurd, ‘The International Rule of Law and the Domestic Analogy’ (2015) 4(3) Global 
Constitutionalism 365, 367. 
25 Cf Peters, above n 23, 10. 
26 Cf Andrea Bianchi, ‘Ad-hocism and the Rule of Law’ (2002) 13(1) European Journal of 
International Law 26; O’Donoghue, above n 23, 217. 
27 O’Donoghue, above n 22, 218. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Peters, above n 23, 9. 
30 Julian Arato, ‘Constitutionality and Constitutionalism beyond the state: two perspectives 
on the material constitution of the United Nations’ (2012) 10(3) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 627, 634; O’Donoghue, above n 22, 252. 
31 Anne Peters, ‘Dual Democracy’ in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds), The 
Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009) 263. 
32 O’Donoghue, above n 22, 200; Garrett Wallace Brown 'The Constitutionalization of What? 
(2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism 203. 
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amongst the differing forms within the Global Constitutionalism debate. For example, the 
role of human rights and jus cogens norms within the normative strands of global 
constitutionalisation ought to be subjected to the feminist analysis of international human 
rights law and its critique of the public/private divide in supporting their operation.   
 
From here this chapter focuses on ‘structural constitutionalism’.  Global constitutionalism 
accepts the norms of ‘structural constitutionalism’ – rule of law, separation of powers and 
democratic legitimacy – with little critique. Within domestic constitutionalism, these 
structural devices lead to questions about the formation of policies,33 used as distancing 
devices by courts to decide the scope of their jurisdiction34 often overlooking questions about 
how the policy impacts on the lives of people. At the global level disconnection is 
exacerbated where ‘structural’ constitutional questions are manifested in international 
institutional reforms35 and the internal affairs of states are side-lined. Reliance is placed on 
these structural devices, despite the disconnect with the lives of people whose concerns are 
rejected at the expense of the  states’ interests.36 Global Constitutionalist literature has 
traditionally avoided suggesting reforms for the internal dynamics of the state, rather it has 
referred to the state as an actor in international law and global governance37 and has used 
the internal affairs of the state only as evidence for a complementary role for global 
constitutionalisation.38 Its concerns with the identification and legitimation of power,39 its 
reliance on conservative legal methodologies and structures, and its constructed distance 
from the localised effects of global governance, make global constitutionalisation ripe for 
feminist critique. This chapter responds to the calls for a feminist approach to global 
constitutionalisation.40 
III FEMINIST CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
                                                 
33 Aziz Huq, ‘Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism’ (2012) 100 California Law 
Review 887, 890. 
34 Se-shauna Wheatle, Principled Reasoning in Human Rights Adjudication (Hart Publishing, 
2016) 124, 207. 
35 Klaus Bosselmann, ‘Global Environmental Constitutionalism: Mapping the Terrain’ (2015) 
21 Widener Law Review 171, 172; Markus Kotzur, ‘Overcoming Dichotomies: A Functional 
Approach to the Constitutional Paradigm in Public International Law’ (2012) 4 Goettingen 
Journal of International Law 585. 
36 Milewicz, above n 3; Huq, above n 33. 
37 Thomas Kleinlein, ‘Non-state actors from an international constitutionalist perspective: 
participation matters!’ in Jean d’Aspremont (ed), Participants in the International Legal 
System: multiple perspectives on non-state actors in international law (Routledge, 2013) 43, 
43. 
38 Peters, above n 3, 579. 
39 Schwöbel, above n 13, 29. 
40 Lang et al, above n 10, 4. 
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Irving suggests that a constitutional gender audit must be aware of both the possibility for 
progress or regression dependent on the form and structures of power it grants.41 Thus any 
project that seeks to use constitutionalism needs to know the pitfalls enmeshed within it but 
also the great advances that feminist activists and scholars have made in pushing 
constitutionalism toward feminism. 
 
Generally, constitutions are not written by women.42 The constitutions on which others are 
modelled, such as the US or Indian, were constructed in the absence of women. In the 
former’s case women (and slaves) were not human enough to have the legal protections or 
rights that liberal constitutional paraphernalia such as the rule of law, separation of power or 
democratic legitimacy, promote. Constitutions offer a rubric by which constituent and 
constituted power holders engage with each other in a frame of power and law. But this is 
engagement based on assumptions of reasonableness and impartiality where all 
constituents are both free and equal, even if the society that it aims to reflect is one where 
gender equality remains absent.43  
 
This apparent neutrality of constitutions is manifested in the theories of constitutionalism. 
Hasday argues the exclusion of women from the ‘constitutional canon’ is such that even the 
struggles to bend constitutionalism toward gender equality, a substantive alteration to its 
operation, is by and large omitted from the central texts.44 Over generations women have 
contested and, sometimes, reclaimed for the half of world’s population space and voice 
within constitutionalism. Nonetheless, a system which purports to neutrality, as 
constitutionalism does, makes difficult a re-imagining that moves away from such 
underlying assumptions.45 
 
Feminist constitutionalism aims to rebuild and rethink constitutional law to reflect feminist 
experience and debate, to redefine its parameters and aims, to refocus its ambitions and 
open it to new concerns. In doing so, it has demonstrated the inadequacies of an existing and 
                                                 
41 Helen Irving, Gender and the Constitution: Equity and Agency in Comparative Constitutional 
Design (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 23; Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law Essays on 
Law and Morality (Oxford University Press, 1979) 214-8. 
42 Laura E Lucas, ’Does Gender Specificity in Constitutions Matter’ (2009) 20 Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law 133; Catherine MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of 
the State (Harvard University Press, 1989) 238; Kim Rubenstein and Katherine Young, The 
Public Law of Gender (Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
43 MacKinnon, above n 42, 163. 
44 Jill E Hasday, ‘Women’s Exclusion from the Constitutional Canon’ (2013) University of 
Illinois Law Review 1715, 1716. Hasday discusses the work of Akhil Amar America’s Unwritten 
Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We Live By (Basic Books, 2014) which also 
discusses other omissions from the canon including battles for racial equality.  
45 There have also been other sites of contestation of constitutionalism including from a post-
colonial perspective. See, Upendra Baxi, ’Postcolonial Legality’ in Henry Schwarz, and 
Sangeeta Ray (eds), A Companion to Postcolonial Studies (Blackwell, 2001) 540; Mahmod 
Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism 
(Princeton University Press, 1996). 
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exalted constitutional system that by its very nature inculcates dynamics of patriarchal 
power and dominance.  
 
A Rule of Law 
 
While not inevitably linked to constitutionalism it is hard to imagine constitutionalism absent 
the rule of law.46 Often wrapped in a very particular political cloak, thin rule of law relies on 
procedure for fairness. Thick rule of law inculcates human rights into its operation, aiming 
toward a more protective sphere where constituents challenge the acts of political decision-
making.47 Both thick and thin rule of law reveal the nature of constitutionalism under 
consideration. Thin rule of law centres upon an individualism where the basic form of society 
operates equally, even if in reality this is not the case, and thus substantive protection is 
unnecessary. Thin rule of law is reliant on the neutrality of law itself which as Catherine 
MacKinnon argues is predicated upon on a ‘society, [that] absent government intervention, 
is free and equal; that its laws, in general, reflect that; and that government need and should 
right only what government has previously wronged’48 requiring a minimalist rule of law. 
Even within thick rule of law the nature of power requires a form of protectionism against 
constituted governance as substantive inequality is always a possibility.  
 
Thick or substantive rule of law is distrustful of power and assumes the need for contestation 
both against and to engage the state’s interference. This suggests the possibility for a more 
feminist account of the rule of law. Yet, substantive rule of law is not inevitably feminist. In 
particular, if the protected rights are only those manifested in the interaction between state 
and so called public action it is more likely to reinforce gender inequality and the division into 
the public and private spheres. Hilary Charlesworth notes that the subjects of international 
law, states, are constructed on this division of labour between private and public spheres.49 
Nonetheless, as demonstrated by feminist scholars it is possible to underpin the rule of law 
with rights and rights interpretation that is not gendered and rejects women’s absence from 
the constitutional community.  
 
While the contemporary rule of law ought to mean that even in older constitutions where 
masculinised language remains in situe constitutions will not be interpreted to exclude 
women, the rule of law does not ensure that women enjoy ‘full membership of the 
constitutional community.’50 This in turn has a direct impact upon other constitutional 
structures, in particular, democratic legitimacy. Feminist rule of law necessitates the 
implementation of substantive equality as core to rule of law. 
 
B Separation of Powers 
 
                                                 
46 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (2008) 43 Georgia Law Review 1. 
47 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin, 2011), ch 7. 
48 MacKinnon, above n 42, 163. 
49 Hilary Charlesworth, ‘Alienating Oscar? Feminist Analysis of International Law’ in Dorinda 
G Dallmeyer (ed), Reconceiving Reality: Women and International Law (American Society of 
International Law, 1993) 1, 9-10. 
50 Irving, above n 41, 63. 
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Division of powers or indeed the separation of power has thus far managed to avoid being 
defined with any great enthusiasm or detail.51 What can definitively be stated is that 
constituted power is divided to ensure that one site of governance does not hold the main 
points of decision making, be it executive, legislative or judicial. In addition, this division 
supplements the dividing of power by enabling each constituted power holder to hold the 
others in check.52 At its most traditional it is as Vile’s suggests 
 
…essential for the establishment and maintenance of political liberty that the 
government be divided into three branches…[e]ach branch of government must be 
confined to the exercise of its own function and not allowed to encroach upon the 
other functions of the other branches. Furthermore, the persons who compose these 
three agencies of government must be kept separate and distinct…[i]n this way each 
of the branches will be a check on the others and no single group will be able to 
control the machinery of State.53   
 
This focus on constituted power within separation of powers means that it identifies a form 
of aggressive and dominant authority which must be divided to hold in check any egotistical 
and avaricious overstretching by one set of constituted power holders over another, or 
indeed over constituents. Thus, by its very nature, it assumes a covetous power always 
fighting to take hold of more authority. Rather than a shared or interactive form of 
constituted power; it is combative at its core. It is also innately hierarchal and while it shares 
power at one point even in a federalised system, there is no attempt to fracture constituted 
power or bring constituent power closer to its operation. The separation of power is entirely 
driven by the notion of fences, supremacy, monitoring, hierarchy and defence. The 
traditional tripartite division, which Montesquieu assumed was necessary to avoid tyranny, 
was entirely based on a public notion of power held by men in their traditional sites of public 
power and while it pushed against monarchical or dictatorial power, it is innately 
conservative and does not question why constituted power operates in such a manner.54  
 
The traditional tripartite division between the legislature, judiciary and executive is bound to 
French and US experiences of revolution, rebellion and the removal of monarchies and 
tyranny. Their radical roots however became bounded to 18th and 19th Century legalism 
which was increasing conservative in its regard for the role of women in public life.55 
                                                 
51 Christoph Möllers, The Three Branches: A Comparative Model of the Separation of Powers 
(Oxford University Press, 2013); Jeremy Waldron, ‘Separation of Powers in Thought and 
Practice’ (2013) 54 Boston College Law Review 433, 433-435. 
52 M J C Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 
1967) 18. 
53 Ibid 13. 
54 Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Thomas Nugent trans, Hafner, 1949) [first 
published 1748]. 
55 George Lachmann Mosse, Nationalism and sexuality: respectability and abnormal sexuality 
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Conservatism’s innate paternalism, focus on practicality – a practicality based upon the 
maleness of political life – hierarchy and incremental change leaves little space for the 
separation of powers to be a source of feminist change.56  The underlying assumption of 
covetous power further buttresses the conservative ideal as any change, even incremental, 
is dangerous, as it could unleash this power and revert the system to tyranny. Fences, 
supremacy, monitoring, hierarchy and defence are all necessary and the radicalness of 
revolution and rebellion no longer desired. 
 
The separation of powers also precedes on the basis that division will ensure that the 
neutrality of law is preserved, particularly through the judiciary. Constitutionalism requires 
government of law not of men and any deviation from such neutrality by courts is checked 
by the other two constituted powers.57 Such legal neutrality of law and courts has been 
repeatedly demonstrated to be inaccurate and indeed the work of Feminist Judgments 
projects  clearly sets out the terms in which law and courts continue to be male.58 Feminist 
Judgments projects also show how the judicial branch can, even within the confines of 
traditional judicial craft, bring feminist critique to bare on the other branches of government 
and upon constitutionalism itself. 
 
From the outset, modern constitutional thought proposed alternative power beyond the 
traditional sites of governance. For instance, Sieyes considered the necessity of a fourth 
estate.59 Geographical separation of powers eschews the traditional horizontal plane to 
include a vertical idea of power being held at different points. This idea is heavily related to 
subsidiarity and the notion that the state-only descriptions no longer suffices. But, 
geographical separation of powers does not challenge the covetous or combative form that 
separation of power inculcates nor has federalism or subsidiarity proven to be entirely 
feminist. 
 
A more radicalised version of the separation of power moves beyond the traditional three 
divisions, opening the state to other forms of power. For instance, in Bolivia there are 
multiple divisions including rights for mother earth, a cooperative planning model, 
autonomous powers for indigenous populations and other communities, external power of 
the social movements as well as some other elements with the specific intent to disrupt the 
traditional operation of constituted power based on independence, separation, coordination 
and cooperation.60 While these recent innovations do not necessarily change the nature of 
constituted power as a gendered form of governance sustained through the separation of 
powers, it suggests it is possible to disrupt its operation.61 The Bolivian and other South 
American examples are attempts to alter constitutional structures to reflect a socialist 
                                                 
56 Robert Nisbet, Conservatism (Milton Keynes Open University Press, 1986); Michael 
Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Liberty Press, 1991); Edmund Burke, 
Reflections on the Revolution in France (Hackett, 1987/1790). 
57 MacKinnon, above n 42, 238 -239. 
58 Rosemary Hunter, ‘The power of feminist judgments?’ (2012) 20 Feminist Legal Studies 135. 
59 Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, What is the Third Estate? (Frederick A. Praeger, 1964). 
60 Bolivian Constitution 2009, Chapter III Title I Article 12; other examples include Colombia 
and Ecuador. 
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governance order that leaves more space for the voices of Indigenous Americans and the 
poor within society. They show that fluidity beyond the tripartite model is possible. The 
success of these models has not yet been fully tested but they present the possibility that 
alternative methods are imaginable and the ingress by unheard voices into constituted 
power is conceivable.  
 
Both the experiments in South America and the Feminist Judgments Projects reveal the 
possibilities for a feminist separation of powers. While neither unpicked the covetous power 
that conservatism ingrained into the separation of powers both demonstrate that it is 
possible to place alternative voices and sites of governance into its form. Both inhabit 
separation of powers and use its form to disrupt traditional sites of decision making. 
 
C Democratic Legitimacy 
 
Around the world, whilst the project of universal suffrage is near completion, genuine 
democracy for women is still a work in progress. The Vatican City is the last state to deny 
women the right to vote, with Saudi Arabia granting a limited right to vote to women in 2011. 
Beyond the right to vote, comparative constitutional scholarship in particular has brought to 
the fore the need for women’s presence as constituted power holders in executives and 
legislatures. Feminist critique of constitutionalism shows the need for genuine inclusion of 
women in democratic decision-making processes and the necessity of creating spaces for de-
formalised resistance, but also the a priori requirement of their presence in the processes that 
establish constituted power.62  
 
Democracy is predicated on a demos, which in liberal democratic theory is assumed to be 
homogenous. This assumed unity of the democratic polity excludes the voices of women. 
The power relationship between men and women is a dynamic that obfuscates the unity of 
the demos, but it is an inequality that is ignored in the theory. Liberal democracy is built on a 
paradox: it ‘guarantees universal equality to all “persons” while excluding women and other 
subjugated groups from the status of the subject on the basis of “difference” construed as 
inequality or inferiority’.63 MacKinnon shows that ‘[g]ender as a status category was simply 
assumed out of legal existence, suppressed into a presumptively pre-constitutional social 
order through a constitutional structure designed not to reach it.’64 This gives rise to an 
absence of women in the initial process of constitutional identification of constituent power, 
they are not counted as positive political actors nor as constituted power holders. Feminist 
constitutional scholarship identifying women’s absence from constituent power has 
demonstrated how this creates a gap in democratic legitimacy. 
 
Democratic processes and the call for democratic legitimacy cloak the problem of 
constituent and constituted power. It is not enough to grant the right to vote, without first 
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challenging the exclusion of women from the public sphere and ‘the limited political system 
of representation constructed on the basis of this exclusion’.65 Democratic legitimacy means 
more than mere representative or direct democracy. It goes further by suggesting that the 
use of constituted power is only legitimate when that power has democracy at its roots.66 
What follows is that law, and constitutional law suffers a legitimacy gap where constituted 
power has emerged without direct engagement by women.67 In scenarios where women 
have been entirely excluded from the nexus between constituent and constituted power the 
law created and enforced is illegitimate in its attempts to regulate their lives.68 The radical 
nature of the action taken against what was and is illegitimate power has always been at the 
centre of feminist action.69 
 
This brief discussion of feminist constitutionalism cannot hope to set out fully the breadth of 
scholarship that domestic and comparative feminist critique has established. Rather it 
establishes both the depth of the critique and its importance to contemporary ideas of 
constitutionalism. This next section sets up where global constitutionalism shows 
unacknowledged indebtedness to this scholarship but also where direct feminist critique is 
necessary.  
 
 
IV BARRIERS: GENDERED NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SCHOLARSHIP 
 
Orford notes that feminist international law questions ‘the justice of the international legal 
order’.70 Would global constitutionalism centred on questioning justice facilitate reform to 
international law, could it bring about a form of global constitutionalism disentangled from 
both conservative domestic constitutional traditions, international law’s imperial past and 
gendered elements of international law? The section explores the prospects for such a 
project. 
 
Within the feminist international law, proposals for critical change abound. Orford highlights 
attempts to develop an alternative practice in reading international law.71 Threadgold argues 
that change can be brought about by re-examining the narratives told be international law 
                                                 
65 Ziarek, above n 63, 8. 
66 James Tully, ‘The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of 
Constitutionalism and Democracy’ (2002) 65(2) Modern Law Review 204. 
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68 See for example, Elizabeth Katz, ‘Women’s Involvement in International Constitution-
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and re-telling them in a new frame.72 However, such calls are mitigated by an orthodoxy – 
similar to conservative claims within constitutionalism - who suggest moderation. D’Amato 
argues that ‘[i]f feminists want to “use law to transform an oppressive society”, they would 
be better off “taking law as it is, with all its rationality, objectivity and abstraction”’.73 
Similarly, Simma and Paulus suggest that the role of feminist scholarship is to use ‘the 
transformative potential of the adaption of positive law to meet women’s concerns’.74 Some 
describe international legal scholarship as hostile to feminist theory.75 If international law is 
gendered at its core,76 then a feminist critique can only hope to have limited impact. Even 
where there are victories, these can come at the cost of weakening the feminist 
emancipatory goals.77   
 
Effecting change in global constitutionalisation through a feminist re-reading of 
international and constitutional law depends not just on the feminist objectives and 
methodologies, but also on the potential for re-reading within the discipline. If global 
constitutionalism follows the voice of moderation and traditional legal frames that some 
international legal scholars advocate, it is unlikely that a feminist constitutionalism can 
emerge. Nonetheless, the relative youth of global constitutionalism debate means that such 
orthodoxy has yet to become embedded in the discourse and so potential remains.  
 
At the surface there is an increasing commitment to gender issues in the institutions of 
Global Governance.78 Examples include the creation of UN Women to co-ordinate the UN’s 
work on gender, the passing of Resolution 1325 aiming to incorporate women into peace 
processes, as well as commitments by the UN General Assembly to end violence against 
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women.79 However, feminist scholars such as Otto and Charlesworth have warned that this 
use of ‘inclusive language’ is misleading.80 States and other actors within international law 
have manipulated feminist arguments to give legitimacy to their decisions.81 The UN’s 
engagement with gender issues has become synonymous with ‘women’s issues’ and 
criticised for becoming limited ‘gender-mainstreaming’.82 These examples suggest a 
superficial engagement with feminist theory.83 The UN’s continued failure to meet its own 
gender quotas amply demonstrates this failure. Since 1986 the UN has consistently failed to 
meet every quota, it has set for the Secretariat and its Agencies to achieve gender parity.84 
This lack of leadership at the heart of international governance demonstrates the shallow 
nature of its engagement with feminism. 
 
One of the barriers to feminist international law is the distance created between global 
governance and local decision-making and people.85 International law still priorities the state 
as its focal point, which has two consequences. First, there is a tendency to approach power 
relations as being contained by the state. 86 Second, global constitutionalisation and 
international law have both traditionally relied on the construction of a divide between the 
state and international law, and global constitutionalisation rarely engages with the 
domestic affairs other than to justify its existence as complementary. Yet, feminist 
experiences do not always take place at the state, they can be localised and, as contemporary 
feminist thought acknowledges, women’s vulnerability can arise from transnational forces. 
Feminist theory and international law ‘cannot adequately challenge gender injustice if they 
remain within the previously taken-for-granted frame of the modern territorial state.’87  
 
Despite these limitations, there is room for optimism about the potential for feminist theory 
to effect change. International law, albeit selectively, bears witness to feminism having 
impact. For instance, Otto refers to repeated formal commitments to realising women’s 
equality.88 Though to be impactful, she suggests that feminist critique has to stay removed 
from hegemonic power by staying ‘outside the institutions of government’.89 The capture of 
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women’s organisations and political strategies is not without precedent within international 
law. The activities of women’s organisations in the 1918 Paris Peace Conference was 
essential in ensuring women were entitled to join the League of Nations Secretariat.90 Yet, 
their establishment of NGO lobbying of international conferences is rarely credited as a 
women’s political innovation. In that instance women created their own network, their own 
active constituency to ensure their participation in the new organs of international law.  
 
Tentative optimistic conclusions from international law testify to the value of feminist 
critique to substantive change but also the potentiality of further iterations of feminist 
international law. Whether these are networks of women holding the UN to account, the idea 
of an iterative constituent power,91 or the process of re-telling the stories international law 
tells itself, feminist international law remains as vital as ever. Nonetheless, as feminist 
scholars have reiterated repeatedly the space for women’s voices, the acceptance of 
feminism as a ‘legitimate’ critique and the potential for capture of feminist campaigns 
remains an ever-present danger. The next question is how to bring feminist international and 
constitutional critique to bare upon global constitutionalism. 
 
V GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A FEMINIST MANIFESTO 
 
 "The ballot is not even half the loaf; it is only a crust - a crumb.”92 
 
What are the contents of feminist global constitutionalism? A preliminary question is what 
change feminist theorists would want to bring to global constitutionalism. Global 
constitutionalism starts with international law that, as Charlesworth highlights, excludes 
women’s voices: ‘the silence of women is an integral part of the structure of the international 
legal order, a critical element of its stability’.93 As already considered, such silencing finds its 
correspondent within domestic constitutionalism. The silencing of particular women and 
their lived experiences is endemic. For instance, subaltern women through representation by 
the Global North’s feminist traditions is a self-critical example.94 But this example also warns 
against re-fashioning existing barriers within international law into constitutional forms that 
inevitably continue to silence subaltern women but re-close the small fissures that feminism 
achieved. From here, this chapter will set the groundwork for a feminist global 
constitutionalist manifesto. Such a manifesto must cover the ex ante processes, constitution-
writing and evolution, and contents of constitutional systems. Seven agenda points aims to 
set a foundation for debate and are based on understanding feminism as necessitating a 
discursive space that ensures voice and deliberation for legitimacy. 
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The first element of the feminist global constitutionalism manifesto is that women are active 
agenda setters in global constitutionalism. We cannot replicate the fait acompli presented at 
the domestic level. Rather substantial constituent involvement and contestation on what 
ought to be put on the schema for inclusion in global constitutionalism is essential. We ought 
not consider such engagement legitimate if, for instance a constitutional convention, 
academic or otherwise, takes place in the absence of women. Women set a precedent for 
such agenda setting in their activism during the writing of the League of Nations Covenant 
and their engagement in the drafting of the UN Charter. While both these incidences 
resulted in small adjustments to texts, these were critical, particularly the inclusion of women 
in both these organisations, to ensure that women were regarded as a necessary part of 
international relations even before such acceptance within states.95  
 
The second element of the manifesto requires that agenda setting move beyond a 
Eurocentric gaze both regarding the forms of constitutionalism it looks to but also the 
international legal authorities it relies upon. Other sites of international legal and governance 
evolution are not populated by the Global North and masculine power brokerage. Within the 
global constitutionalisation debate this is not the case. While there are signs that scholarship 
is moving beyond its European frontiers it is incumbent upon current scholars in the field to 
seek and engage with the much wider community of scholarship if it is to avoid the historic 
Eurocentrism that plagues international law.  
 
The third element of the manifesto is a right of rejection. Feminist global constitutionalism 
must contain a power of rejection, to discard either elements or the entire base of a global 
constitutionalist agenda. Should global constitutionalism’s agenda become a re-assertion of 
patriarchal constituted power or a re-iteration of traditional public international sites of 
governance, feminist agenda setting would enable the rejection of such a pursuit. While this 
may result in the end of the project then it may be a necessary cessation. This right of 
rejection is not time limited. As global constitutionalism evolves, as domestic 
constitutionalism does, women must retain the right to reject such change. 
 
As noted above, women rarely write constitutions, this cannot be the case for global 
constitutionalism. The forth manifesto point is that women co-write the constitution. 
Encouraging, within the academic debate women are important actors and, on many fronts, 
lead the debate.96 More negatively, much of the existing international law that global 
constitutionalism relies upon has not been as inclusive. Through decades of activism, women 
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have ensured they are legally entitled to be part of the international institutional machine, 
including academia.97Nonetheless, this representation remains partial and those present 
cannot fall into the trap which Orford outlined of ‘saving’ or perhaps more prosaically 
representing what a feminist constitutionalism may mean for them but not women’s global 
concerns. Just as men’s imprint has always been evident in constitutional and international 
law, women’s imprint must be equally as strong a force in the content of global 
constitutionalism.  
 
Writing the constitution must go beyond being in the room, women must be substantively 
involved in constitutionalisation and this is the fifth manifesto demand. Women must be 
involved substantively in the writing and evolution of the constitution. The experience of 
transitional justice is particularly instructive on this basis. While Security Council Resolution 
132598 was hailed as a landmark99 for the role of women in peace and security, subsequent 
practice shows it fails to fulfil the potential set forth.100 While UN Women, the Sustainable 
Development Goals and the Millennium Development Goals are hortatory in their language 
toward gender equality and participation, as O’Rourke has commented, there is a feeling 
that transitions to peace ought to be transformative for women but the reality is that the 
forms of gender harm particularly in the private and public dichotomy remain.101 As such, 
constitutional agenda setting and writing, even if mandated to have women present, does 
not necessarily manifest itself in feminist outcomes. The substantive character of the 
involvement of women and feminist debate is critical at both the point of agenda setting and 
writing.102 The engagement of women in transitional justice constitution-making 
demonstrates both the potentialities but also the gaps in what international law has thus far 
achieved in incorporating feminist ideals of constitutionalism. It also demonstrates the 
difficulties with using international law to ‘save’ groups of women in the Global South and 
how a lack of engagement with them in designing their own involvement can have 
unintended consequences. Encompassed in this manifesto point is a dedication to 
considering just what ‘writing’ means from the perspective of all participants and not simply 
replicating the conventions and conferences of constitutional and international legal lore. It 
also requires perseverance. Regarding constitutions as living documents has enabled women 
to insert themselves into domestic constitutionalism through legislative change and judicial 
activism. Writing constitutions includes women’s active participation in the evolution of the 
global constitutionalist debate. 
 
The sixth manifesto point requires real concern for constituent and constituted power. The 
structural form that a feminist global constitutionalism takes is bound to the interaction 
                                                 
97 Charnovitz, above n 95, 68. 
98 SC Res 1325, UN SCOR, 4213th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1325 (31 October 2000). 
99 Office of the Special Adviser on Gender, Landmark resolution on Women, Peace and 
Security <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/#resolution>. 
100 Catherine O'Rourke, Gender Politics in Transitional Justice (Routledge, 2013); Catherine 
O’Rourke 'Walk[ing] the Halls of Power'? Understanding Women's Participation in 
International Peace and Security’ (2014) Melbourne Journal of International Law 128. 
101 O'Rourke, Gender Politics in Transitional Justice, above n 100, 237. 
102 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin and Michael Hamilton, ‘Gender and the rule of law in transitional 
societies’ (2009) 18 Minnesota Journal of International Law 380, 395-396. 
Aoife O’Donoghue and Ruth Houghton 
Can Global Constitutionalisation be Feminist?  
19 
 
between constituent and constituted power. Instead of replicating the forms of rule of law 
and separation of powers rather, we can ‘reread’ the dialectic of constituent and constituted 
power. Accountability, and mechanisms for holding constituted power to account, is central 
to the norms of structural constitutionalism. In relation to constituted power, a feminist 
approach demands stronger accountability mechanisms.103  
 
Women’s suffrage movements highlight the myth of constituent and constituted power in 
constitutional law ensuring equality, particularly the blindness of constitutional democratic 
forms to constituents that fail to meet the standard of citizen. As Ziarek argues  
   
The creative freedom of women’s militancy both evokes and redefines another 
paradox of revolutionary action, namely, the incommensurability between 
constituted and constituent power, articulated for the first time in the course of the 
French Revolution by Sieyes in terms of “his famous distinction between a pouvoir 
constituant and a pouvoir constitute”.104  
 
The conflation between constituting power and national sovereignty presents a problem for 
political theory in general and for feminist politics in particular.105 ‘If the constituting power 
is identified with national sovereignty, then its excess is interpreted, as has historically been 
the case, with the transcendence of the sovereign will and disconnected from the multiplicity 
of contingent political struggles.’.106 In other words, the particular interests of people are lost 
within the constructed notion of “The People.”107 As Linera argues, modern constituent 
power ought to be, ‘based on what we really are as opposed to simulating what we will never 
be nor could be’.108 Feminism has always called for a recognition of what a society actually is 
rather than some idealised form of citizen entitled to constituent power. But this reality is 
one that is manifestly not static. Rather it is a form of constituent power which must 
continually reconceptualise itself at the global level to ensure that the multitude of women’s 
voices are articulated.109 For constituent and constituted power to work for women, the 
narratives of the idealised citizen or constituent must always be capable of reconsideration 
in the context of constituted power’s operation.  
 
The seventh manifesto call is the right to revolt. Within the global constitutional context, 
discussions on democracy focus on the extent to which global constitutionalisation can 
complement the domestic processes. There is little discussion on the de jure denial of the 
right to vote and continuing de facto exclusion. Democratic legitimacy in international law is 
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tied to voting and elections.110 Yet, suffrage movements redefined the right to vote as a right 
to revolt, indeed they had to revolt so as to construct a political identity that was not present 
in the constitutional structure. Ziarek argues that the ‘reinterpretation of the right to vote as 
the right to revolt reclaims and redefines in the context of gender politics and important 
legacy of the revolutionary tradition, namely, the productive tension between the 
constituted, institutionalized character of power and its inaugural, constituting force’.111 
Feminist global constitutionalism must insist on this right to revolt as a basis of continued 
contestation. This may be made manifest in combination with the other manifesto points. 
For instance, in the rejection of the part or the entire paradigm and the forms of privilege 
which has allowed the Global North to frame both international law and constitutionalism.  
 
A right to revolt inculcates continual challenges to constituted power but does not undercut 
constitutionalism to a point of nothingness. Locke asserted that constituent power is 
maintained by the notion that it can always take back the legitimacy to act given to 
constituted power holders.112 As the suffragettes demonstrated and present activists who 
manifest their revolt in presenting themselves to authorities or the media as violators of 
constitutional law through control of their own contraceptive decisions, women challenge 
the authority of constituted power holders to both regulate their body and they work to 
agitate legal change. Revolt is a continual necessity to drive constitutionalism forward and 
establishing this within global constitutionalism will require a reconsideration of its current 
terms of reference.  
 
Revolt is central to conceptualising a global feminist separation of powers. As discussed 
above, the separation of powers is the ultimate display of covetous and combative power but 
is also conservative in its maintenance of the status quo. As Wall comments ‘the constitution, 
and the state that apparently emanates from it…seek[s] to quell instability’ but as Wall goes 
on to argue ‘instability, contestation and contradiction’113 are central to a new order that is 
multifarious. Existing constitutionalism has examples of such constituent disruption of the 
separation of powers and feminism forefronts this contestation. Feminist global 
constitutionalism must include space for such fracturing both of the sites of separation of 
powers but also by puncturing constituted power. A feminist global separation of powers 
would have to go beyond a horizontal and vertical division and check as these inculcate its 
combative and covetous forms. Rather separation of powers must be multidimensional and 
multifarious and enable space for constituent revolt. 
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As already discussed the rule of law in its thin form assumes an equality amongst 
constituents that has never been the case within constitutionalism.114 Revolt lies at the heart 
of keeping equality within the domain of global constitutionalism. In international law, much 
is made of an operational international rule of law. Yet, the notion that international law, at 
the very least, is made, enforced and adjudicated openly is debatable, and whether it prevails 
in all circumstances remains a live debate.115 Substantive rule of law within a feminist global 
constitutionalism is a necessity. Thin rule of law’s assumptions of equality would merely 
replicate the existing system where the myth of sovereign equality permeates contemporary 
international law.116  
 
Within global constitutionalism much is made of a burgeoning rule of law though 
surprisingly, given its prominence within international law, human rights are not a major area 
of deliberation. Rather, the focus tends to be on legitimacy, what international rule of law 
adds to domestic constitutionalism and human rights as a sub-group of international law.117 
Jus cogens and erga omnes are also prominent in the debate, but it is not their substantive 
content that is at issue rather emphasis is placed on their roles as peremptory norms within 
a hierarchical structure.118 Yet, as was already demonstrated jus cogens are by no means 
feminist and without substantive reform and expansion they remain tied to masculine 
objectives and priorities.119  
 
Yet, while sovereign equality gains much traction within international law, as Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) scholars demonstrate, this is by no means the case 
in practice.120 Further as constituents within a feminist global constitutionalism will not be 
categorized by the traditional hard lines of international law, the need for a functional 
understanding of equality within the rule of law that is derived from feminist jurisprudence 
and experience with constitutionalism will be necessary. Further, the “public” elements of 
international law mean that a layering of the public/private divide has beset it as evidenced 
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in constitutional-making within transitional societies.121 As such, any feminist global 
constitutionalism will have to consider how it will dismantle the public/private divide to 
ensure that the gendered nature of the rule of law can be eliminated.  For constituent action 
to remain operative and to ensure that the international rule of law does not suffocate the 
right to revolt, feminist notions of voice and equality must remain at the core of global 
constitutionalism.  
VI CONCLUSION 
 
‘Constitutions found nations, define states, and ground and bind governments.’122 If 
constitutional power is male power how do we break that link, if the law sees and treats 
women as men see and treat women is it at all possible for there to be a disentangling? Here 
we suggest there is a potentiality within the law to be feminist and that the nascent character 
of the global constitutionalist debate provides an opportunity to define its agenda, terms and 
parameters in a feminist way. But it is imperative that women are engaged with global 
constitutionalism from the beginning or else feminism will have to re-fight to open the 
fissures that feminist activism introduced to domestic and international law. The seven-point 
manifesto establishes how this can be achieved.  
 
The approaches to certain tensions within feminism (equality and difference) and what is 
regarded as necessary to achieve either or both is something that neither constitutionalism 
nor international have successfully addressed. Yet, a global feminist constitutionalism could 
have both in its sights. Where its potential might lie is in having the space to explore both as 
within global constitutionalism the identity of the constituents and their power and interests 
are far from yet determined. Here feminism can contribute to an agenda that can be global 
in geography in a true sense that is not simply horizontally with countries and international 
organisations but rather a multiplicity of sites of power. What is then necessary is for the 
feminist debate to be inculcated into the global constitutionalist discourse alongside TWAIL 
and sub-altruism and other critical voices. Here we have set out suggestions of where global 
constitutionalism might be feminist to show where the possibilities lie. 
 
Our manifesto for a feminist global constitutionalism and its seven demands are a starting 
point for a discussion of where the debate could go. Women’s place in setting the agenda, a 
move beyond Euro-centracism, a right to reject the paradigm or a part thereof, women 
present in writing and forming the constitution, substantive and not procedural engagement 
of women, real concern for the nexus between constituent and constituted power and the 
nature of democratic legitimacy and perhaps most critically, the right to revolt. Of course, 
the rich scholarship of feminist constitutionalism should inform all aspects of the global 
constitutionalism debate. These seven manifesto points stand as a baseline from which the 
global constitutionalism can choose to gain traction and legitimacy by both recognising its 
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inheritance from domestic constitutionalism but also acknowledging the unique qualities of 
the global constitutional debate. 
